The Effect Of Household Debt Servicing Costs On Expenditure Growth by Michel, Jared Alexander
University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects
January 2017
The Effect Of Household Debt Servicing Costs On
Expenditure Growth
Jared Alexander Michel
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michel, Jared Alexander, "The Effect Of Household Debt Servicing Costs On Expenditure Growth" (2017). Theses and Dissertations.
2131.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2131
THE EFFECT OF HOUSEHOLD DEBT SERVICING COSTS ON EXPENDITURE GROWTH 
by 
Jared Alexander Michel 
Bachelor of Science, University of North Dakota, 2017 
Master of Science, University of North Dakota, 2017 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty 
of the 
University of North Dakota 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  
Master of Science 
 











Degree Master of Science 
 
 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate 
degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University 
shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive 
copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my 
thesis work, or in his absence, by the Chairperson of the department or the dean of the 
School of Graduate Studies. It is understood that any copying or publication or other 
use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my 
written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and 
to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any 






                                                                                            Jared Michel 
                                                                                            May 3, 2017
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………………………..…….……………………. v 
LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………………………..…….………………..……. vi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS …………………..……………………………..……………….…………………… vii 
ABSTRACT ………..………………………………………..……………………………….…………………… viii 
CHAPTER  
I. INTRODUCTION …………………………………...………………………………………. 1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW …………………………….………………………………………. 4 
III. DATA ……………………..…………………………………………………………………… 10 
IV. MODELS AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ……………………….……………………… 17 
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS …………..…………………….…………………………..…… 26 
VI. EXTENSION OF RESULTS ……………………….……………………………………… 32 
VII. CONCLUSION …………………………….………………………………………………… 37 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Visualization of the Spending Normalization Hypothesis ……………………..………………. 6 
2. Density Histogram of Debt Service Ratio Observations ……………………………………… 13 
3. Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio Indicator Coefficient  
    Estimate Across Time ..………………………..………………………………………………………… 22 
4. Heterogeneity of Coefficient Estimates across Age Deciles ..……………..……………….. 28 
5. Heterogeneity of Coefficient Estimates across  
    Liquid-Asset-to-Income Deciles ..……………………………………..……………………………… 28 
6. Share of Households with High DSR ..…………………………..…………………………………. 35 
7. Change in Share of Households with High Debt Service  
    Ratio over 5 Years ….…………………………..………………………………………………………… 35
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Universal Classification Codes Used in DSR Construction ……………………….………….. 11 
2. Effect of a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on 
    Expenditure Growth ..……………………………….………………………………….………………… 18 
3. Effect of a Positive Change in a Household’s Debt Service 
    Ratio on Expenditure Growth—Changes Across Time ..……………………………….…….. 23 
4. Effect of a Positive Change in a Household’s Debt Service  
    Ratio on Expenditure Growth—Controlling for Size of the Change ….…………..……… 23 
5. Comparing Constrained and Unconstrained Households ……………………………………. 30 
6. Examining Alternative Time Frames …………………………………………...…………………… 30 




 I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Goenner and others who have been instrumental to 
my success on this project and to everyone in the University of North Dakota Economics 




This study examines the effect of debt-servicing costs on subsequent 
expenditure growth. Quarterly expenditure data on US households from the US Labor 
Department’s Consumer Expenditure Survey are utilized in a typical regression 
framework, and an emphasis is placed on determining the effect of a positive change in 
a household’s debt-servicing costs on expenditure growth. Initial results reaffirm the 
literature in showing a negative relationship between leverage and expenditure growth. 
However, upon controlling for the change in each household’s debt-servicing costs, the 
strong relationship disappears, and instead, a strong negative relationship between 
positive changes in a household’s debt-servicing costs and subsequent expenditure 
growth is found to be the dominant force at play. Further work shows that the main 






An important element to understand within the realm of household 
microeconomics is the role that personal debt plays in determining economic outcomes. 
Proper understanding of debt and its consequences can help shape economic policy, 
which in turn can help to promote stronger economic growth with less volatility. Yet, the 
complex intricacies of how debt interacts with other economic components are not fully 
understood, and so there is an ongoing need for continued research. 
 Still, progress has been made in recent years to understand the connections 
between personal debt and economic outcomes. For example, the view that households 
with more leverage at the onset of the 2007-08 financial crisis experienced larger 
spending declines during the subsequent recession has a strong empirical foothold. 
However, there is not complete agreement as to the mechanism behind it. One possible 
explanation is that tight credit conditions have limited households’ access to liquidity, 
and as a result, expenditure growth has suffered. Likewise, it could also be the case 
that households have taken part in voluntary deleveraging due to precautionary 
concerns such as worries about future access to credit. Both of these explanations imply 
a causal relationship between high debt and lower future expenditure growth. Yet, it is 
still possible the strong negative association reflects an alternate reality. The households 
2 
 
with greater leverage might also be the households that experienced a greater change 
in their debt balances prior to the crisis. For example, a household that takes out a new 
mortgage potentially exhibits both a large change in debt and a large absolute level of 
debt. Thus, the negative relationship between high leverage and expenditure growth 
might instead reflect a negative relationship between large changes in debt and 
subsequent expenditure growth. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to explicitly investigate the alternate 
explanation noted above. The results will first reconfirm the earlier literature that shows 
households with a higher degree of leverage experience a lower level of expenditure 
growth relative to low leverage households. Then it will be demonstrated that 
controlling for each household’s change in debt obligations eliminates the statistical 
significance between a household’s high leverage status and future expenditure growth. 
Meanwhile, a strong, significant negative relationship between a positive change in a 
household’s debt balance and future expenditure growth will be garnered from the data 
instead. Finally, robustness checks will reveal that the main results hold across various 
years and across groups of households that are more or less likely to be liquidity 
constrained. 
 The analysis of this paper will be performed using quarterly US household-level 
data. A series of ordinary least-squares regressions will be employed to compare 
expenditure growth rates between households of high and low leverage and between 
households of high and low debt growth. This strategy will be very similar to one used 
in earlier research that examined Danish households before and after the financial crisis 
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(Andersen, Duus, and Jensen 2016). That study found that the negative relationship 
between high leverage and future expenditure growth disappeared upon controlling for 
the change in each household’s debt level, and in addition, the results showed a strong 
negative association between positive changes in household debt and subsequent future 
expenditure growth. The authors also demonstrated that the results held across various 
years and across groups more or less likely to be liquidity constrained. Thus, the results 
of this paper very closely mirror yet extend the conclusions reached by Andersen, Duus, 
and Jensen (2016). Specifically, this paper uses data from a different country examining 
a different time period and applies a distinct measure of debt unique from Andersen, 
Duus, and Jensen (2016), yet it will be shown that the resulting conclusions are very 
similar. This extension of results is the main source of this paper’s value. 
The remaining portions of this paper will proceed as follows. Section II will 
provide a more in-depth look at past literature and how it ties into this paper’s story. 
This will be followed up by Section III which will discuss the data source and 
construction of key variables. Section IV will share the models and empirical analysis. 
Sections V and VI will be devoted to robustness checks and implications of the results, 





Significant progress has been made in recent years to understand the real 
connections between personal debt and economic outcomes. For example, research has 
revealed a strong negative correlation between household leverage prior to the 2007-08 
financial crisis and subsequent spending growth during the recession. Using credit card 
data, Mian and Sufi (2010, 2011) found that households in US counties with larger 
amounts of leverage prior to the recession experienced sharper expenditure declines 
during and after. This was then extended upon in their later work (Mian, Rao, and Sufi 
2013) where they concluded that households reduced spending by 5-7 cents for every 
$1 of housing wealth lost during the financial crisis. Thus, more leveraged households 
exhibited sharper spending declines.  
The case for this conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that other authors 
have made very similar conclusions using a variety of other data sets. Dynan (2012), for 
one, utilized the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to demonstrate households that were 
more leveraged in 2007 experienced larger declines in spending between 2007 and 
2009. Subsequently, Dynan and Edelberg (2013) utilized the Federal Reserve’s Survey 
of Consumer Finances to show households with more leverage in 2007 were more likely 
to self-report spending cutbacks over the next two years. Also, studies from abroad 
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(Bunn and Rostom 2015; Andersen, Duus, and Jensen 2016) have confirmed this notion 
of a negative relationship between leverage and expenditure growth. 
Despite this widespread agreement, ambiguity still exists as to the mechanism 
causing the correlation. There are two predominant arguments in the literature. One 
theory suggests that credit constraints limit credit access to those households with 
higher leverage, and therefore, a negative causal relationship develops between 
leverage and future spending. The other theory is that households with higher leverage 
voluntarily reduce their debt level due to worries about future access to credit and 
future ability to smooth expenditure. Most authors, however, admit that the explanation 
is multi-faceted. Brown, Haughwout, Lee, and van der Klaauw (2013), for example, 
found that both tightened lending conditions and voluntary reductions in debt have 
contributed to the drop in overall household leverage since the financial crisis. Both of 
these explanations imply a causal relationship between the magnitude of a household’s 
debt level and future expenditure growth. Although, this implication could be masking 
the true connection between debt and future expenditure growth. 
It is quite possible that households with larger debt balances are also the ones 
that experience larger absolute changes in their debt balances. Consequently, it might 
be the case that a strong relationship between high debt balances and future 
expenditure growth just reflects the positive correlation between high debt balances and 
large changes in debt. Thus, the true debt-expenditure-growth relationship might be 
driven by a household’s change in debt level rather than the magnitude of it. This 
alternate view is consistent with the spending normalization hypothesis put forth by 
6 
 
Andersen, Duus, and Jensen (2016). Specifically, the authors suggest that some 
households temporarily exhibit debt-financed above average spending growth for a time 
and then must slow their expenditure growth in order to return to a “normal” level of 
spending.  
A simple illustration of this idea is provided in Figure 1. The chart represents two 
households that are identical as of the first time period, and both households experience 
the same growth in disposable income throughout. However, Household A increases its 
total expenditure by 4 units between time periods 1 and 2, and Household B increases 
its total expenditure by just 1.5 units over the same time frame. The difference in 
growth can be explained by the fact that Household A borrowed 2.5 units in order to 
increase its total expenditure by more than its growth in disposable income.  
This figure provides a simple illustration of the spending normalization hypothesis; it depicts two households that 
are identical as of time period 1. Household A increases its total expenditure through debt-financed spending 
between time periods 1 and 2 whereas Household B just experiences smooth, natural expenditure growth due to 
factors such as wage increase. Household A subsequently experiences slower expenditure growth relative to 
Household B. The spending normalization hypothesis argues that this reflects the negative relationship between 
changes in a household’s debt level and subsequent expenditure growth. 
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Subsequently, Household A reduces its total expenditure by 1 unit between time 
periods 2 and 3 in order to return to a “normal” level of spending after its temporary, 
debt-financed boost while Household B increases its own by 1.5 units due to continued 
disposable income growth. Therefore, Household A experiences relatively slower 
expenditure growth. Someone with data from just time periods 2 and 3 would conclude 
that a negative correlation exists between debt balances and expenditure growth. This 
is because Household A exhibited both a relatively higher debt balance in time period 2 
and relatively smaller expenditure growth between time periods 2 and 3. Although, this 
analysis would be missing half of the story. In reality, it is Household A’s relatively large 
change in debt between time periods 1 and 2 that causes the household to experience 
relatively smaller growth in total expenditure. Thus, the computed negative correlation 
between debt balances and expenditure growth is simply reflective of the fact that debt 
balances are positively correlated with changes in debt. This is the essence of the 
spending normalization hypothesis: it makes the distinction that a household’s change in 
debt level is most important for the debt-expenditure-growth relationship.  
Importantly, a number of studies have already confirmed a connection between 
change in debt and future expenditure. Ekici and Dunn (2010) and Stephens (2008), for 
example, both find that spending responds to a change in a household’s debt level. A 
$1000 increase in credit card debt in one quarter is associated with a subsequent 
decline in quarterly expenditure of about 2% (Ekici and Dunn 2010). Stephens, though, 
shows that expenditure responds to changes in debt in the opposite direction as well. 
Households experiencing a 10% increase in discretionary income due to exogenous loan 
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repayment were found to increase nondurable expenditure by about 2-3%. Thus, both 
studies offer ample evidence that a relationship does in fact exist between a household’s 
change in its debt obligations and its future expenditure growth.    
Likewise, the results shared by Andersen et al. (2016) expand the current 
discussion on changes in household debt. Using detailed asset and imputed spending 
data of 500,000 Danish households between 2002 and 2011, Andersen et al. (2016) 
were able to study how both the magnitude and change in debt affect expenditure 
growth. They were able to confirm the earlier literature by finding a strong negative 
correlation between leverage and expenditure growth before and after the financial 
crisis. Although, upon controlling for each household’s change in debt, they found that 
the negative correlation between each household’s debt level and its subsequent 
expenditure growth disappeared. Consequently, this result proposes that the smaller 
expenditure growth witnessed among high leverage households in the wake of the 
financial crisis was, in fact, driven by those households’ positive change in debt levels 
prior to the crisis.  
This is a novel conclusion, and it is somewhat surprising this view has not 
received more attention till recently since it is consistent with the idea that borrowing a 
large amount in one time period pulls future demand forward. More importantly, one 
should note that the paper also found that the relationship between a positive change in 
debt and expenditure growth also held in other years and across groups that are more 
or less likely to be borrowing constrained. This suggests that credit availability during 
the financial crisis years was not special in some way such that it was the dominant 
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driver of the drop in personal expenditure for households during that period. Rather, the 
results along with the spending normalization hypothesis instead suggest that the 
widespread drops in personal expenditure indicate that more households than normal 
exhibited above average, debt-financed spending increases prior to the crisis, and by 
extension, more households than normal experienced spending normalization 
simultaneously once the crisis set in. This implication will be explored further later in the 
paper. 
To summarize, this paper is motivated by a few main ideas from the literature. 
First, evidence exists showing that households with more leverage prior to the financial 
crisis experienced sharper spending declines during and after. Many authors have 
interpreted this as a causal relationship where a high amount of debt leads to lower 
consumption growth due to credit constraints or voluntary deleveraging. However, the 
spending normalization hypothesis put forth in the literature counters this by arguing 
that the negative relationship between debt balances and expenditure growth simply 
reflects the high positive correlation between debt balances and changes in debt. 
Meanwhile, empirical studies have shown that changes in household debt affect 
expenditure growth. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to provide additional evidence 
towards the spending normalization hypothesis by arguing that changes in a 
household’s debt obligations have a real impact on household expenditure growth and 
are more important than the actual size of a household’s outstanding debt level. As a 
result, this analysis will essentially extend the work of Andersen et al. (2016) by using a 





The data for this paper comes from the US Labor Department’s Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the years 1997 to 2013. This rotating panel survey 
allows for detailed tracking of American household spending and, therefore, offers an 
ample way to study factors that might affect expenditure choices. Data is collected 
quarterly on a weighted sample of several thousand households that is constructed to 
represent the entire US population. Each chosen household is included in the sample for 
a period of five quarters. The first survey round collects demographic and general 
information about each household, and this is followed up by four rounds of expenditure 
data collection. In the context of the current paper, it is also important to note that 
income information pertaining to the past 12 months is collected during the second 
survey round. 
 This structure of the CEX survey was used to construct the sample for this paper. 
Each household’s five survey rounds of data were consolidated into a single observation 
representing that household. So, each observation in this paper’s sample was comprised 
of general demographic and income data as well as four quarters of detailed 
expenditure data for a specific household. The quarterly expenditure data available for 
each household consisted of detailed spending data broken down by the CEX’s universal 
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classification codes (UCCs). This made it possible to calculate both a household’s total 
spending and spending within sub-categories for each quarter. 
List of universal classification codes identifying specific payments in the CEX survey used to construct this 
paper’s debt service ratio measure. 
The main variable of interest in this study is each household’s debt service ratio 
(DSR). This measure aims to capture the ratio of expenditure on debt servicing to 
regular income1. Examining this debt metric is especially interesting compared to a 
standard debt balance because it more accurately reflects the burden that outstanding 
debt places on a household. For example, if a household has a high debt balance yet 
the monthly payment is relatively low then the high debt balance alone might not 
provide as much information as a DSR would about how that debt affects the 
expenditure choices of the household. Moreover, the DSR is constructed based on 
criteria set forth by Johnson and Li (2010) and includes all typical amounts paid towards 
principal and interest on automobile and mortgage debt. This includes payments toward 
                                                          
1 After-tax income was utilized here and throughout this paper. 
Table 1: Universal Classification Codes Used in Debt Service Ratio Construction 
Debt Payment Type CEX UCCs 
Primary Residence Mortgages 220311, 830201 
Home Equity Loans Secured by Primary 
Residence 
220313, 830203 
Lines of Credit Secured by Primary 
Residence 
880110, 880120 
Mortgages, Home Equity Loans, Lines of 
Credit Secured by Vacation Homes and 
other Property 
220314, 790940, 830204, 220312, 790920, 
830202, 880210, 880220, 880310, 880320 
Vehicle Loans 850100, 870103, 870203, 870803 
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both primary and secondary mortgage debt as well as home equity debt. Table 1 lists 
the CEX universal classification codes used in the construction of the DSR. 
Unlike Johnson and Li (2010), however, the DSR constructed in this paper does 
not include payments on consumer credit debt. This is because consumer credit 
information is only collected from households during their second and fifth interviews. 
Therefore, it is impossible to calculate a change in these debt levels and still relate it to 
a household’s future expenditure. This difference in the construction of the DSR should 
not be seen as improper, though, since Johnson and Li (2010) assumed payments on 
consumer credit to be 2.5% of the total balance which equates to a small percentage of 
total monthly debt service payments for most households. Also, one should realize that 
Johnson and Li (2010) focused on typical debt payments rather than required payments 
since earlier research (Bucks and Pence 2008) has shown households remember their 
loan payments more accurately than their loan terms when completing surveys. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of DSRs in this paper’s sample. Notably, the 
tall bar on the far left of the histogram reflects the large number of households that do 
not have any debt payments and, therefore, have a zero debt service ratio. Otherwise, 
the distribution of DSRs seems to be very smooth and skewed right with the most 
common DSR coming in at about 0.15. These characteristics make sense since it is 
reasonable to believe that most households pay around 15% of their typical income to 




Furthermore, parts of the analysis compared the effects of a high DSR on 
household expenditure growth. Thus, it was necessary to define what constitutes a high 
DSR. To accomplish this, households with a nonzero DSR were sorted into quintiles and 
those with a zero DSR were placed into their own zeroth bin. Then, observations within 
the third, fourth, and fifth quintile bins were defined as high DSR households. Next, the 
change in each household’s DSR was computed by subtracting the initial DSR in one 
quarter from the final DSR in a later quarter as shown in equation 1 below: 
∆𝐷𝑆𝑅1−2,ℎ = 𝐷𝑆𝑅2,ℎ − 𝐷𝑆𝑅1,ℎ (1) 
The notation in the equation indicates that the change in household h’s DSR between 
time periods 1 and 2 is calculated by subtracting the household’s first period DSR from 












0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Debt Service Ratio
Figure 2: Density Histogram of Debt Service Ratio Observations
This figure provides an illustration of the distribution of debt service ratios across the sample of this paper. 
The large density of observations on the left represents the large number of households with no debt 
payments and, therefore, a zero debt service ratio. A few outliers to the right are not included in this chart 
to avoid zooming too far out from the distribution’s main features. 
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What is more, a number of control variables were constructed based on general 
household information in the dataset—some of which applies to the head of household 
exclusively. These controls included age, age-squared, high school and college 
graduation status, race, gender, marriage status, family size, state of residence, town 
population size, housing status, and number of automobiles2.  
A majority of these control variables with the exception of state of residence, 
town population size, and number of automobiles were constructed following the 
example set by Johnson and Li (2010) in order to control for any effect general 
household characteristics might play in determining expenditure growth. Indicators for 
state of residence and town population size were defined in order to control for any 
differences in expenditure growth across different regions of the US. Likewise, 
information regarding the number of automobiles a household owns was included to 
compliment the housing status control. Johnson and Li (2010) originally included an 
indicator for home ownership as an imperfect way to control for household net worth. 
Thus, controlling for the number of automobiles a household owns is done with the 
same purpose in mind. In addition, households were sorted into income and 
expenditure-to-income deciles to control for non-linear income and initial expenditure-
to-income effects.  
Measures of liquidity relative to income for each household were constructed 
based on checking and savings account balances reported in the fifth survey. Since 
                                                          
2 A table of some key summary statistics can be found in the Appendix. 
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these balances are only collected in the fifth survey, it is assumed each household holds 
a similar balance in earlier quarters in order to control for liquidity. This assumption is 
supported by the fact that about 77% of households reported that their checking 
account balance was about the same as a year ago, and about 65% of households 
reported their savings account balance was about the same as a year ago. Also, the 
results of this study change a negligible amount when each of the specifications is rerun 
only including households that report both their checking and savings account balances 
are about the same as the year prior. Furthermore, observations were then categorized 
into high and low liquidity households where a low liquidity household was defined as 
one with a liquid-asset-to-income ratio of less than 2.5%. This is consistent with the low 
liquid asset indicator presented by Johnson and Li (2010). Finally, controls for time 
fixed-effects were also constructed based on the month each survey interview was 
completed, and all monetary figures were deflated to real 2000 dollars. 
At this point it is also important to note the lack of a net-worth variable in this 
study. A lack of data prevents construction of this sort of variable. However, there are 
two reasons why this likely does not matter. First, the coefficients of interest in the 
results of Andersen et al. (2016)—which this paper’s results closely follow—changed 
very little before and after controlling for net-worth. This suggests that the results 
shared below should be robust across groups of more or less net-worth. Even so, 
controlling for each household’s housing status and number of automobiles owned—as 
was mentioned previously—should offer a partial solution to the problem. Status of 
home ownership with no mortgage, for example, rather than status of home ownership 
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with a mortgage or renting should be positively correlated with net-worth, and in a 
similar fashion, the number of automobiles owned should at least be partially correlated 
with net-worth. 
Observations in the sample were necessarily filtered. Households with 
nonsensical DSR or expenditure data were dropped from the sample, and likewise, 
households reporting zero or negative income were dropped as well3. Finally, 
households with heads aged less than 21 or greater than 65 were dropped to eliminate 
students and retirees from the sample (Johnson and Li 2010). This process identified a 
sample consisting of about 45,000 households. 
                                                          
3 Observations with a change in their DSR or expenditure level less than the 1st percentile or greater than the 
99th percentile, respectively, were dropped. This resulted in 1238 dropped observations. This was done since 
several observations had changes in their DSR which implied their debt service payments increased or decreased 
by an amount equal to many times larger than their quarterly income. Likewise, observations were eliminated 
due to computed changes in expenditure level that were many factors larger than the household’s respective 
income. Both of these problems can likely be attributed to partially inaccurate income data since households 
were asked to report their income from the prior 12 months rather than their current income. This should not be 
a huge concern for the vast majority of observations, though, since most households have steady income from 




Models and Empirical Analysis 
The crux of this study is to examine the effects of debt and changes in debt on 
expenditure growth. Naturally, therefore, the dependent variable in each of the 
following models is the change in expenditure for each household from one quarter to 
the next. The change in expenditure is measured relative to income following the 
example set by Andersen et al. (2016) to ensure households of different levels of 
income can be compared. It is important to keep this in mind later when interpreting 
results. 
The first goal of this analysis was to replicate results from the literature that 
have demonstrated a negative relationship between household leverage and subsequent 
expenditure growth. To do this, a simple equation of the following form was 
constructed: 
∆𝐸3−4,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅3,ℎ + 𝜖 (2) 
In this equation, ∆𝐸3−4,ℎ is computed by subtracting total expenditure of household h in 
survey three from total expenditure in survey four and then dividing by quarterly 
income. Thus, the variable represents a change in expenditure relative to income from 
survey three to survey four for household h. Similarly, 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅3,ℎ is an indicator for 




The dependent variable in both Columns 1 and 2 is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey 
4 relative to income. Other categorical controls include race, state of residence, town population size, 
housing status, number of automobiles, income decile, and initial expenditure-to-income decile. Results for 
these variables are suppressed due to the unreasonable amount of space that would be required to show 
them all. In addition, monthly dummies were included to control for time fixed effects. *Significance at the 
10% level, **Significance at the 5% level, ***Significance at the 1% level.  
Table 2: Effect of a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on Expenditure 
Growth 
 (1) (2) 
















































Other Categorical Controls Included Yes Yes 
Monthly Time Controls Included Yes Yes 
Observations 45,123 45,123 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0168 0.0220 
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observations as of the third survey4, 𝑋ℎ is a vector of household controls, and 𝑇 is a 
vector of time period controls. Column 1 of Table 2 shares the corresponding regression 
results. 
Consistent with earlier literature, the coefficient estimate on the high DSR 
indicator in column 1 is significant, and it implies that households with a DSR in the 
third, fourth, or fifth quintiles in the third survey period experienced smaller expenditure 
growth relative to households with a zero or first or second quintile DSR. Essentially, the 
coefficient represents a difference in difference estimate comparing changes in 
expenditure between high and low DSR households.  
Also, since ∆𝐸3−4,ℎ was constructed by dividing change in expenditure between 
surveys three and four by quarterly income, the coefficient estimate can be interpreted 
as a difference in income percentage points. Thus, the coefficient estimate of -0.0376 
indicates that high DSR households increased expenditure by 3.76 fewer income 
percentage points than low DSR households. That is to say, if hypothetical households A 
and B are identical in every way except household A is a high DSR household and 
household B is not, then household A might increase its expenditure by an amount 
equal to 10% of its typical quarterly income whereas household B would only be 
expected to increase its expenditure by an amount equal to 6.24% of its quarterly 
income. The 10% figure was arbitrarily chosen for illustration purposes, but the bottom 
line is that the coefficient estimate implies that expenditure growth for households with 
                                                          
4 Criteria laid out in the data section of this paper defined a household as having a high DSR if its DSR was in the 
third, fourth, or fifth DSR quintile bins. 
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a DSR in the third, fourth, or fifth quintiles is expected to be smaller by an amount 
equal to about 3.76% of their income relative to their expected expenditure growth if 
they had a zero or first or second quintile DSR instead. 
The results in Column 1 reaffirm findings from prior literature that a negative 
correlation exists between leverage and subsequent expenditure growth. This is notable 
because it lays the foundation required to fully examine the spending normalization 
hypothesis. In fact, the next step towards investigating the hypothesis was to add a 
control for changes in a household’s DSR to determine how the estimated coefficient on 
the high DSR indicator might change. This is important because the hypothesis suggests 
that the negative correlation between leverage and expenditure growth reflects the 
positive correlation between positive changes in debt and high levels of leverage.  
The equation 2 model was rerun with an additional indicator variable specifying 
whether or not each household increased its DSR from the second to third surveys. 
Column 2 of Table 2 presents results for this modified analysis. The magnitude of the 
high DSR coefficient is now much smaller than it was previously, and the estimate is 
insignificant. Meanwhile, the estimated coefficient on the indicator variable for a positive 
DSR change is highly significant and negative. Taken together, these observations imply 
that households of higher or lower DSRs experienced similar expenditure growth rates, 
and instead, households that increased their DSR experienced smaller subsequent 
expenditure growth relative to those with consistent or declining DSRs.  
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Notably, column 2 is consistent with early results shared by Andersen et al. 
(2016) and succeeds in providing initial evidence towards the spending normalization 
hypothesis. This is because the -0.1558 coefficient on the positive DSR change indicator 
implies that households who experienced an increase in their DSR increased their future 
expenditure by 15.58 income percentage points less than households that decreased or 
maintained their DSR levels. The spending normalization hypothesis rationalizes this by 
arguing that households who increase their expenditure through debt-financed spending 
in one time period return to a more “normal” level of spending in a later time period. 
Thus, a parallel interpretation of the Table 2 results is that households who increased 
their DSR between surveys two and three necessarily experienced smaller expenditure 
growth in the subsequent time period in order to return to a “normal” level of spending. 
A natural question that arises from the results of Table 2 is whether or not the 
coefficient estimate on the positive DSR change indicator varies over time. This is an 
important topic to investigate because one might argue that debt has played a larger 
role in some years more than others. This is especially true of the years surrounding the 
financial crisis. For instance, it might be natural to think that increases in debt might 
have mattered less to future expenditure growth in the pre-crisis “bubble” years when 
households were increasing their leverage at historic rates. On the other hand, it might 
also be natural to believe and the literature has suggested that increases in leverage 
may have weighed more heavily on future expenditure growth in the years since the 
financial crisis due to increased credit constraints or voluntary deleveraging. Therefore, 
the model presented in equation 2 was tweaked slightly in order to explore these 
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avenues. The positive DSR change indicator was interacted with yearly dummy variables 
to evaluate changes across time. The coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence 
intervals for each year are presented in Figure 3.  
Coefficient estimates of positive DSR change indicator variable across time. 
An informal eye test of Figure 1 suggests that the coefficient estimate may have 
actually decreased in magnitude sometime in the middle 2000s. To be sure, a formal 
test of this phenomenon is presented in Table 3 where equation 2 was reanalyzed with 
an additional positive DSR change indicator interacted with a dummy variable specifying 
households after 2005 (Column 1) or after 2007 (Column 2). 
Both the 2005 and 2007 coefficients in the two models are positive and highly 
statistically significant. This is strong evidence pointing to a change in the relationship 
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Figure 3: Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio Indicator 
Coefficient Estimate Across Time 
Point Estimates 95% Confidence Interval
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Table 3: Effect of a Positive Change in a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on 
Expenditure Growth—Changes Across Time  
 (1) (2) 









Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x After 2007  
0.0669*** 
(0.0241) 
Controls Included Yes Yes 
Observations 45,123 45,123 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0225 0.0222 
 
The dependent variable in both Columns 1 and 2 is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey 
4 relative to income. Controls are the same as specified in Table 2. *Significance at the 10% level, 
**Significance at the 5% level, ***Significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 4: Effect of a Positive Change in a Household’s Debt Service Ratio on 
Expenditure Growth—Controlling for Size of the Change 
 (1) (2) 





Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x Size of Debt 





Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x Size of Debt 




Controls Included Yes Yes 
Observations 45,123 45,123 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0243 0.0244 
 
The dependent variable in both Columns 1 and 2 is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey 
4 relative to income. Controls are the same as specified in Table 2. *Significance at the 10% level, 





heavily on expenditure growth in the earlier years of this data set. However, this doesn’t 
seem likely since it contradicts the logic used earlier. Instead, it is possible this 
difference in the coefficients across time reflects the fact that households increased 
their DSR at a faster rate in the earlier years of the data set. If this is the case and if 
expenditure responses are proportional to the magnitude of a given DSR increase then 
controlling for the size of that increase should eliminate the difference in the coefficients 
across time.  
Controlling for the size of each household’s change in DSR requires an additional 
alteration to equation 2. Equation 3 reflects that alteration:  
∆𝐸3−4,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅3,ℎ 
+𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ ∗ ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ + 𝜖 
(3) 
The only difference with this new model is the interaction of ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ with the 
previously defined 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−3,ℎ. With this interaction in place, the model now 
controls for the actual size of household h’s change in DSR. Column 1 of Table 4 
features results from this updated equation. 
 There are a number of notable takeaways from this new set of results. First and 
foremost, the basic concepts established in earlier discussion still hold. The lack of any 
significance on the high DSR indicator means that households with high and low DSRs 
still have similar expenditure growth after controlling for changes in the household’s 
DSR. Also, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and highly significant. Its 
estimated value of -0.7783 implies that households that increase their DSR increase 
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their subsequent expenditure by about 7.78 fewer income percentage points than 
households with consistent or declining DSRs for each increase in their DSR equal to 
10% of their income. Put more simply, households who increase their DSR by a large 
amount will lag the non-increasing households in expenditure growth more than 
households who increase their DSR by a small amount. 
Next, the coefficient was tested for heterogeneity across time. It is possible that 
controlling for the size of each DSR change eliminated the estimated coefficient 
differences demonstrated earlier in Table 3. Like earlier, the interaction term was 
multiplied by a dummy variable specifying if a household was interviewed after 2007. 
The coefficient on this term—in column 2 of Table 4—is found to be highly insignificant; 
this implies that the interaction term did not change across the sample period. In 
addition, this restructured model helps defend the argument used earlier to explain the 
varying coefficient estimates across time (Table 3). Once the size of each DSR change 
was controlled for (Table 4), the coefficient estimate was robust across the various 
years. Therefore, the relationship between DSR changes and expenditure growth did 
not change across time. Rather, households were, in general, increasing their DSRs by 





This section devotes itself to checking the robustness of the results shared so 
far; this is done in two steps. First, an analysis is performed to check the role that 
supply side factors play in this paper’s models. This is important because a rapid rise in 
a household’s DSR can affect its subsequent expenditure change due to choices made 
by the household or due to supply side factors such as a limit on access to capital. Thus, 
this part of the sensitivity analysis will examine coefficient estimates across groups of 
households of varying levels of supply-side constraint. Furthermore, the second part of 
the robustness section will check to ensure that the results presented up to now are not 
sensitive to the period of examination for DSR changes. Each household’s change in 
DSR will be recalculated over a two quarter time frame rather than a single quarter time 
frame, and the models will be rerun. 
Therefore, the first goal of this robustness section will be to explore the 
possibility that the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the positive DSR 
change indicator and the size of the DSR change variable differs across groups that are 
more or less likely to be constrained in their access to liquidity. This is important 
because it might be the case that constrained households are the ones driving the 
results derived so far. If this is the case, then it would be evidence aligning with prior 
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studies arguing that credit constraints have played a strong role in the lack of borrowing 
and therefore have been a cause of lackluster expenditure growth. Two of the ways 
Andersen et al. (2016) performed this check was by sorting households into both age 
and liquid-asset-to-income ratio deciles and then investigating if the target coefficient 
varied across the bins of each decile sorting. This is an appropriate way to check the 
estimated coefficient across groups of varying levels of constraint because one might 
expect younger and less liquid households to be more constrained.  
An almost identical exercise is performed in this study to compare coefficient 
estimates of the interacted term for different aged and liquid households. The estimates 
were constructed by interacting the age and income decile indicators with the 
interaction term from equation 3. Thus, a point estimate and 95% confidence interval 
for each age and income decile was constructed. These estimates are illustrated in 
Figures 3 and 4, respectively. There appears to be little evidence that the target 
coefficient varies over the different age and liquidity groupings. The estimated 
coefficient is found to be similar for younger and older households, and likewise, it is 
about the same for more and less liquid households too. There are very few groups that 
are statistically distinct from one another, and so, overall it would seem that the 
estimated coefficient is not different across groups traditionally thought to have more or 
less access to liquidity.   
This study, however, further verifies the claim that the estimated coefficient does 
not vary across groups of households that are more or less likely to be constrained 




The coefficient estimate and 95% confidence interval for the target coefficient of each decile bin. 
 
The coefficient estimate and 95% confidence interval for the target coefficient of each decile bin. Note: 
The liquid-asset-to-income decile sorting was contingent upon each household having a nonzero reported 
savings or checking account balance. If the household reported a zero balance for both account types then 


























































present evidence that expenditure of households within the CEX who have a DSR in 
either the fourth or fifth quintile and have low liquidity is sensitive to past income. 
According to the authors, the fact that the expenditures of this chosen group of 
households are sensitive to past income is evidence that they are in fact liquidity 
constrained because it hints at the fact that a higher level of income would be 
associated with a relaxation of the constraints. This presents an excellent alternate 
opportunity to study differences in the estimated coefficient between two groups of 
varying liquidity constraint.  
A constrained indicator variable was constructed based on the criteria shared in 
Johnson and Li (2010). Households with a DSR in the fourth or fifth quintile of DSRs and 
with less than 2.5% of their monthly income in liquid assets are defined as constrained. 
It should be noted that Johnson and Li (2010) do not make the argument that 
households excluded from the constrained group are in fact free of constraints. Rather, 
there is just a high degree of certainty based on their evidence that the households in 
the constrained group are relatively more liquidity constrained. Furthermore, the 
constrained indicator variable is interacted with the positive DSR change indicator term 
and added to an amended version of equation 3 shown below: 
Results from equation 4 are presented in Table 5. The coefficients for constrained and 
unconstrained households are found to be statistically indistinguishable from each other. 
  
∆𝐸3−4,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ 




Table 5: Comparing Constrained and Unconstrained Households 
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x  
Size of Debt Service Ratio Change x  
“Constrained” Indicator 
Constrained = 0 
-0.8006*** 
(0.1219) 
Constrained = 1 
-0.7676*** 
(0.1208) 
Controls Included Yes 
Observations 45,123 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0243 
This table compares coefficients between groups of households shown to have varying levels of constraint 
placed on them according to Johnson and Li (2010). A household is defined as a constrained household if 
it has a DSR in the fourth or fifth quintiles and has a total liquid-asset-to-income ratio of less than 0.025. 
The dependent variable is household expenditure change from survey 3 to survey 4 relative to income. 
Controls are the same as specified in Table 2.*Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5% 
level, ***Significance at the 1% level. 
Table 6: Examining Alternative Time Frames 
High Debt Service Ratio 
-0.0032 
(0.0101) 
Positive Change in Debt Service Ratio x  
Size of Debt Service Ratio Change 
-0.6034*** 
(0.1199) 
Controls Included Yes 
Observations 44,779 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0253 
The dependent variable is household expenditure change from survey 4 to survey 5 relative to income. 
Controls are the same as specified in Table 2.*Significance at the 10% level, **Significance at the 5% 
level, ***Significance at the 1% level. 
This means that constrained households do not experience a more profound 
expenditure response than unconstrained households.  
 Therefore, the robustness checks so far are consistent in that they all suggest 
liquidity limitations are not the most likely explanation for the negative correlation 
between positive changes in a household’s DSR and its subsequent expenditure growth. 
However, it should be made clear that this does not mean factors such as credit 
constraints do not matter, but rather, they are less important in the models examined in 
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this paper. This gives additional rise to explanations such as the spending normalization 
hypothesis.  
Moreover, one might also wonder if the results generated in Table 4 are sensitive 
to the somewhat arbitrary choice of quarterly DSR changes. To investigate this, 
equation 3 is altered slightly: 
∆𝐸4−5,ℎ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑋ℎ + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅4,ℎ 
+𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ ∗ ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ + 𝜖 
(5) 
The 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ , ∆𝐷𝑆𝑅2−4,ℎ , and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐷𝑆𝑅4,ℎ variables have all been changed to 
consider each household’s DSR as of the fourth survey and how it is has changed since 
the second. Likewise, the dependent variable now measures each household’s 
expenditure growth between surveys 4 and 5 instead. This slightly changed version of 
equation 3 is reanalyzed, and its results are demonstrated in Table 6. The estimated 
coefficients are found to be consistent with earlier results. The high DSR indicator 
coefficient is found to be statistically insignificant while a large negative relationship is 
reconfirmed for the interacted term. Thus, Table 6 increases the confidence held in this 
paper’s earlier results, and more broadly, this section has demonstrated that the 
estimated negative relationship between positive changes in household DSRs and 
expenditure growth is robust across groups of varying levels of liquidity and across an 





The analysis of this paper has worked towards demonstrating the role that a rise 
in debt servicing obligations has on future expenditure. In doing so, the distinction was 
made that an increase in a household’s DSR is more important than the actual 
magnitude of the DSR. It was shown that households that increased their DSR from one 
quarter to the next subsequently experienced smaller expenditure growth than 
households that maintained or decreased their obligations. Then it was shown that 
changes in household DSRs produced similar outcomes across the years of this dataset 
and for households more or less likely to be liquidity constrained.  
 These results align very closely to the conclusions of Andersen et al. (2016). This 
is a significant observation for a number of reasons. Notably, the prior paper used 
annual Danish data to come to their conclusions. The fact that this study was able to 
replicate similar results using quarterly American data eliminates the possibility that the 
conclusions reached by Andersen and others were a fluke caused by time-period or 
country level specific factors.  
On the other hand, the results of the current paper used a different measure of 
debt than Andersen et al. (2016). This paper used a measure of payment obligations 
whereas Andersen and others utilized detailed total debt measures. Awareness of this 
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difference is both interesting and important. It is interesting because we are able to see 
that similar conclusions can be drawn from either measure of debt. It is important 
because total debt only increases when a household engages in new borrowing. This is 
dissimilar from a household’s DSR which can instead increase for two reasons. A 
household could either participate in new borrowing or the interest rate could increase 
on existing debt balances. For example, a household could take out a new mortgage, or 
it could have an adjustable-rate mortgage where the interest rate increases. Either way, 
the hypothetical mortgage-holding household increased its DSR.  
Unfortunately, the households in the CEX do not report enough interest rate 
information in order to study which avenue is the most predominant driving force 
behind the negative relationship derived in this paper. This potentially presents 
opportunity for future study, but in the interim, it is important to consider that these 
facts suggest either an increase in debt balances or a jump in interest rates on 
adjustable-rate debt can lead to relatively smaller expenditure growth.  
Furthermore, tying together the conclusions drawn so far potentially helps to 
explain the severity of the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the subsequent, lackluster 
recovery. It is easily verified that one of the largest components in the overall decline in 
economic activity during that period was the fall in personal consumption expenditures. 
In fact, real personal consumption expenditures per capita declined 3.55% year over 
year (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis) in the midst of the crisis. This was the worst 
decline since at least 1951, and it took relatively longer than past economic recoveries 
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for the year over year measure to sustainably return to its long-term average of 2.1% 
growth.  
These facts naturally raise two questions: “why did real per capita expenditure 
fall so dramatically?” and “why has the subsequent recovery been so slow?” As was 
discussed in the introduction and literature discussion, lots of studies have attempted to 
address the role that debt plays in answering these questions including suggestions of 
credit constraints and voluntary debt reduction weighing on increases in expenditure. 
However, very few have taken the perspective of the spending normalization hypothesis 
to answer the questions. The remainder of this section will attempt to do just that.  
The consistency of this paper’s results using quarterly data along with the results 
of Andersen et al. (2016) using annual data suggests that similar results might also be 
found over other time periods as well. For instance, increases in household debt or debt 
service obligations over several years might lead to smaller expenditure growth for 
those same households over a similar period of subsequent years. Aggregate data, in 
fact, contends this may be true. Glick and Lansing (2010) compared increases in 
household leverage across countries of the world from 1997 to 2007. They found that 
countries that experienced larger increases in leverage during that time period also 
experienced more profound drops in expenditure during the financial crisis years.  
Unfortunately, I am unaware of any household level studies of this type over 
such a long time period, and so, we are left scientifically speculating. However, if indeed 




A household is defined as having a high debt service ratio if its computed DSR is in the top three quintiles of all 
debt service ratios. 
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Figure 7: Change in Share of Households with High Debt 
Service Ratio over 5 Years
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normalization hypothesis could easily apply to the years before and after the financial 
crisis. Figures 6 and 7 help illustrate this point. Figure 6 depicts the share of households 
within each year with a high DSR. The share measure was about 0.395 in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s and increased to about 0.42 by the middle 2000s. Using the Federal 
Reserve’s count of households from the 2001 and 2007 rounds of the Survey of 
Consumer Finances, this amounts to about a 7.9 million increase in high DSR 
households between those years. An imperfect illustration of this increase is depicted in 
Figure 7 where it is easy to see that aggregately a large number of households switched 
from low to high DSR status in the early-to-late 2000s. One potential explanation of the 
severe drop in personal expenditure, therefore, is that a large share of households took 
part in debt-financed above average spending or experienced large increases in 
adjustable-rate debt payment obligations over a period of several years leading up to 
the financial crisis. If the spending normalization hypothesis holds over such long time 
periods then the negative correlation between a positive DSR change and subsequent 
expenditure growth defended in this paper would lead to the conclusion that a large 
number of households necessarily had to underspend during and after the financial 





 This paper utilized household level data from the US Department of Labor’s 
Consumer Expenditure Survey to investigate the connection between a household’s debt 
service ratio and quarterly expenditure growth. A strong negative correlation was found 
to exist between a household’s DSR and subsequent quarterly expenditure growth. This 
confirmed earlier results of the literature. Most notably, however, this paper showed 
that conditioning on a household’s change in its DSR nullifies the statistical significance 
of the relationship. Instead, a very strong negative relationship between positive 
changes in household DSRs and succeeding expenditure growth was found to be the 
driver of the former relationship. This newly found outcome implies that households that 
increase their DSR from one quarter to the next increase their subsequent quarterly 
spending by fewer income percentage points than households with consistent or 
declining DSRs.  
 A number of smaller details were investigated in addition to this broader result. 
First, expenditure responses were found to be proportional to the actual size of a 
household’s DSR change. This was followed up by work demonstrating that the effect of 
DSR changes was stable across time and across groups of households more or less 
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likely to be liquidity constrained. Also, the negative relationship held when the 
inspection period of DSR changes was changed from one to two quarters.  
 Altogether, this paper’s results were consistent with earlier work by Andersen et 
al. (2016). This is notable because this paper’s approach was unique in a few different 
ways. First, this paper used quarterly American data versus annual Danish data. This 
eliminated the possibility that the results of Andersen and others were due to some 
time-period length or country specific factors. In addition, each household’s debt service 
ratio was utilized in the current paper in contrast to a total debt level. This is notable 
because it increases the overall level of robustness and confidence in the conclusions 
reached in both studies.  
 Furthermore, there are a few policy implications of this paper’s results. Since the 
results demonstrate that increases in debt servicing obligations lead to relatively smaller 
expenditure growth rates, this implies that policy makers should pay close attention to 
the growth rate of debt as well as the rapid rise in servicing costs due to a rapid 
increase in interest rates. Doing so could help reduce overall economic volatility. 
Specifically, throttling the rapid growth of debt servicing costs relative to income could 
help prevent extreme drops in expenditures. Policy could, therefore, devote itself to 
educating the public on the consequences of overextending themselves in a short time 
period. Similarly, regulators could work with lenders to temper rapid debt binges, and 
bodies such as the Federal Reserve should be more aware of the consequences of 




 In the future, more attention should be given to studying how changes in debt 
affect future expenditure growth. More evidence is needed to better understand the 
consequences of pulling future demand forward. This is especially true over longer time 
frames. Future micro-level studies should examine whether or not spending 
normalization is supported in data over periods of several years. In addition, future 
researchers could study the cross-product heterogeneity of changes in a household’s 
DSR on various different categories of expenditures. It might be the case, for example, 
that durable expenditures are affected more than nondurable expenditures since 












Table of Summary Statistics 






















Number of Automobiles 
1.05 
(0.94) 
Low Liquidity Household 
0.40 
(0.49) 
Monthly Income (2000 $s) 
4466.23 
(4006.02) 
Change in Expenditure (Survey 3 to Survey 4) 
-0.01 
(0.84) 
Debt Service Ratio 
0.23 
(0.75) 
High Debt Service Ratio 
0.40 
(0.49) 
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